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Civil wars are sometimes referred to as “development in reverse.” They are typi-
cally associated with the destruction of physical capital, and temporary drops in 
income. This has been documented, for example, for Japan by Davis and Weinstein 
(2002), for Germany by Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2004), and for Vietnam 
by Miguel and Roland (2011). A simple Solow-style growth model predicts that, 
following the cessation of violence, capital stocks rebound so that per capita income 
eventually returns to its steady state. The actual speed of recovery following conflict 
is the subject of debate (e.g., Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 2008; Cerra and 
Saxena 2008). When conflict affects institutions, social organization, or other pref-
erences, however, it is not obvious that societies will bounce back to prewar income 
levels. If wars contribute to the erosion of social capital or raise levels of impatience, 
adverse growth and level effects could eventuate. The opposite could happen when 
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war invites institutional improvements or alters preferences in such a way that sav-
ings are encouraged.
A number of African countries have experienced remarkable postwar recov-
ery after civil war. Examples include Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
Undoubtedly, this is partly due to generous aid flows that typically follow the cessa-
tion of violence. Other mechanisms may also be at play, however. Heterodox social 
scientists have long argued that violence can carry the seed of societal reform, spurring 
the expansion of capitalism and promoting economic growth. For example, Cramer 
(2006) points to historical events to support his claim that violence can “produce insti-
tutional changes, amendments to the rule of the game. In retrospect, many changes 
that come to be seen as progressive have their origins in social conflicts that have 
taken a violent turn. Herein lies a paradox of violence and war: violence destroys but 
is also often associated with social creativity” (Cramer 2006, p. 279). A small litera-
ture is now emerging that appears consistent with this perspective. Blattman (2009) 
uses data from northern Uganda and links past abduction by rebels to increased politi-
cal engagement of victims. Bellows and Miguel (2009) report positive correlations 
between violence and political and social behavior in Sierra Leone.
One possible interpretation consistent with this evidence is that exposure to con-
flict induces a shift in preferences. This explanation implies a challenge for orthodox 
economic theory. Economists regard preferences as exogenous and fixed in their 
straw man model of homo economicus (at least in the short term).1 The notion 
of endogenous, or context-dependent, preferences gnaws at the foundations of 
standard welfare theory. Interestingly, there is little opposition to the concept of 
“malleable preferences” in other social sciences. Indeed, in psychology it is widely 
accepted that large (temporary) shocks can have persistent effects on someone’s 
outlook on life (Carmil and Breznitz 1991; Punamäki, Qouta, and El Sarraj 1997; 
Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004), or in economist’s terms, on someone’s preferences. 
Since such preferences are fundamental determinants of consumption, saving, and 
investment behavior—the drivers of economic growth—the notion of endogenous 
preferences has far-reaching consequences for how we should think about develop-
ment. In particular, the scope for vicious and virtuous development cycles may be 
radically altered.
The main objective of this paper is to examine the causal effect of exposure to vio-
lence on behavior in a series of economic experiments, in which payoffs vary between 
choices across three dimensions: timing, riskiness, and social consequences. Key 
questions are: do victims of conflict behave more prosocially, do they have a higher 
propensity to save and invest in the future, and are they more prone to taking risks? 
We try to answer these questions by pulling together survey and new experimental 
data from Burundi. First, we collected detailed information on the (local) history of 
violence in a set of Burundian communities, and on a range of household and com-
munity variables. We then conducted a series of field experiments, implementing 
games to determine risk, time, and social preferences in an incentive-compatible 
fashion. While such preferences have been measured in a variety of contexts, this 
1 In the (very) long run, evolutionary processes can change the distribution of preferences, as suggested by 
Netzer (2009) in the case of risk and time preferences, and by Choi and Bowles (2007) for social preferences, even 
if preferences are still hard-wired and fixed for individuals.
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study is the first to apply experimental methods in a postconflict environment to 
gauge the effect of violence on human decision making.
Our results strongly suggest that exposure to violence affects behavior—possibly 
via altering preferences. We find that individuals who have either experienced vio-
lence themselves, or who live in communities that have been violently attacked, dis-
play more altruistic behavior, are more risk-seeking, and act less patiently. Results 
are robust across several specifications, and are obtained for both experimental data 
as well as observational data collected in the survey (information about social capi-
tal, crop choice, and expenditures on farm improvement). We believe these findings 
shed new light on postwar recovery processes by speaking against overly pessimis-
tic views on the destructive long-term consequences of civil war.
Identifying whether or not preferences are endogenous poses two problems for the 
analyst. The first concern regards the potential endogeneity of the shock due to selec-
tion bias and nonrandom attrition. Although our tests indicate that attrition is unlikely 
to be substantial, we probe the robustness of our findings using various additional 
analyses, including an instrumental variable approach. Second, we cannot directly 
observe preferences. Instead, we observe behavior (in an experiment), and can try 
to make inferences about the underlying preferences. While the literature commonly 
interprets experimental play as reflecting underlying preferences (e.g., Henrich et al. 
2001; Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 2010), behavior and preferences are not identi-
cal concepts. Behavior is affected by many factors, including the (social) context and 
beliefs about the behaviors of others (which may not be invariant with respect to the 
history of violence either). We present these competing hypotheses, and point out that 
our quasi-experimental data do not allow us to separate cleanly the relative importance 
of the various mechanisms linking violence to shifts in behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we discuss the background 
to the conflict. In Sections II and III we describe our data and research design. 
Section IV discusses our identification strategy, including the way we address endo-
geneity issues. In Section V we present our main experimental results, including a 
robustness analysis, and aim to interpret them in the context of economic thinking. 
Section VI concludes.
I. Background to the Conflict in Burundi
Since independence, Burundi has been the stage of nearly three decades of civil 
war between the country’s two main ethnic groups: Hutu (85 percent of the popula-
tion) and Tutsi (14 percent). At the outbreak of the most recent episode of violence 
in 1993, following the assassination of the country’s first Hutu president, Melchior 
Ndadaye, Hutu groups (mostly farmers) targeted Tutsi in retaliation throughout the 
country, killing thousands of Tutsi within weeks. In turn, the Tutsi-dominated army 
responded with indiscriminate and large-scale attacks on Hutu, “ … making no dis-
tinction between communities which had been involved in violence against Tutsi 
and those that were not” (Human Rights Watch 1998, p. 15).
This started a civil war. In the Northern provinces, benefiting from the proximity 
of the Congolese border and the Kibira forest for shelter, several rebel groups formed 
(initially the Conseil Nationale pour la Défense de la Démocratie, but later others fol-
lowed). Much of the war was concentrated near the nation’s capital, Bujumbura, as both 
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rebels and the army fought over its control, but the conflict soon spread to the north-
eastern provinces, and later to central and southern Burundi (for information about the 
evolution of the war, refer to United Nations 1996; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh 
2009; and Chrétien and Mukuri 2000). Eventually, rebel groups and the army ravaged 
communities throughout the country, but a gradient in the intensity of violence is evi-
dent—fighting was more intense near the capital.
Which factors explain patterns of violence in Burundi? Standard explanations of 
greed and grievance appear to have little explanatory power (see Section V below). 
Instead, Uvin (1999) proposes an explanation based on fear. Traumatized by earlier 
waves of violence in the 1970s, Hutu were fearful of being victimized (again) and 
launched preemptive attacks on Tutsi army barracks or Tutsi civilians. The Tutsi-
dominated army responded by killing Hutu indiscriminately. In response, attacks by 
Hutu militia became “increasingly brutal and random, affecting all of the country 
and causing profound fear among Tutsi as well as Hutu bystanders” (Uvin 1999, 
p. 262). Chaos and anarchy erupted, and the civilian population paid a high prize. 
Human Rights Watch refers to most of the victims of violence in Burundi as “proxy 
targets” (Human Rights Watch 1998): while the army and Hutu militias fought for 
control, direct clashes between the rival fractions were rare; instead most of the vio-
lence was unleashed on civilians.
Violence was largely indiscriminate because of the army’s inability to identify 
rebels, but also by a desire for extermination, “revenge by proxy,” plundering, and 
a perceived need to demonstrate power as part of the tactics of fear to control a 
population (Uvin 1999; Krueger and Krueger 2007; for a broader discussion of such 
tactics, see Kalyvas 2006). This type of violence is near-exogenous to household 
characteristics and local economic conditions, hitting communities and civilians 
regardless of social status, education, or income. Both army and rebels arbitrarily 
and sweepingly raided communities throughout the country.2 People were also 
attacked while fleeing or during the creation of “regroupment camps,” between 1996 
and 2001. In areas suspected of rebel activity, the army led a brutal campaign to cut 
off rebel supplies, support, and shelter. Civilians were evicted from their homes and 
forcibly brought together in camps. As an incident report from Human Rights Watch 
states: “[ … S]oldiers would … order people to gather at a specific site. They killed 
anyone who refused” (Human Rights Watch 1998, p. 29). At its apex, an estimated 
total of 220,000 people lived in these camps.
Burundi has only recently started to recover from this violence, which left 
over 300,000 Burundians dead and displaced 1.2 million people (Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza 2000).
II. Research Design and Data
We conducted our series of experiments in March and April 2009, using a sample 
of 300 household heads from 35 communities in rural Burundi. These communities 
and households were drawn from a set of 100 communities that were visited earlier 
2 Unlike the situation in neighboring Rwanda, where conditions of anarchy enabled villagers to settle scores and 
target specific fellow villagers (e.g., André and Platteau 1998), there is little or no evidence of such selective killings 
in Burundi (Uvin 1999).
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in 1998 and 2007 to collect survey data. The 2007 survey included variables on local 
history of conflict, social capital, and a range of household and community variables 
(including proxies for social, risk, and time preferences).3 We randomly selected 35 
communities and revisited all respondents of the earlier survey, inviting them to par-
ticipate in a series of experiments. Of the 35 communities, 24 experienced violence 
in the period 1993–2003, and 11 were not exposed to violence.4
The key variable of interest is our community measure of conflict victimization 
measured as the share of war-related deaths (1993–2003) among the total popula-
tion, resulting from confrontations between the army and rebels or one-sided vio-
lence by either group.5 Such attacks resulted in the death of up to 15 percent of 
the communities’ inhabitants. We also create a household-level victimization index, 
based on the experience of death, theft, ambush, forced labor, and torture of house-
hold members. The index is additive and, given its arbitrary scale, normalized to 
have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 (Table 1, Panel B). A detailed description of 
our variables and their sources is provided in an online Appendix.
III. Experimental Games
For our experiments we adapted well-established experimental game protocols to 
implement social orientation, risk, and time preference experiments. These experi-
ments are discussed in more detail in an online Appendix; to economize on space we 
highlight only key features here.
To measure social preferences we used a modified version of the social value 
orientation experiment devised by Liebrand (1984). Subjects were anonymously 
matched to another participant from their community (their “partner”), and made 
six choices between two own-other payoff combinations, A and B. These combi-
nations differed not only in the proposed division of the sums of money but also 
in the total sums to be allocated. We conducted the experiment offering nonnega-
tive payments only.6 A subject’s social orientation is reflected by the ratio of the 
total amounts of money allocated to the partner and to himself. This ranges from 
totally selfish (if the subject always chose the allocation with the highest payment 
3 The data collection was a collaborative effort between the Institut de Statistiques et d’Etudes Economiques du 
Burundi (ISTEEBU), Antwerp University, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and Wageningen University, and was imple-
mented under the flag of MICROCON—an EU-funded project focusing on household analysis of violent conflict 
in various regions of the world. A first wave of data was collected by the World Bank halfway through the war (in 
1998) in 391 communities. For a total of 1,400 households in 100 communities we have panel data (1998–2007) 
regarding many important household characteristics as well as information on the development and consequences 
of armed conflict. The surveys and their sampling designs are described in an online Appendix.
4 The end of the conflict was officially sealed in 2005 when a new Constitution, largely based on the Arusha 
Peace Agreement, was approved by referendum. Yet, the intensity of conflict in the last 2 years was negligible as 
compared to the intensity in the first 11 years. When constructing our variables on conflict and victimization, we 
focus on the incidents in the 1993–2003 period.
5 Reports of violence are based on retrospective accounts by villagers (collected in village focus group meetings) 
and cross-checked with published reports from ACLED database of PRIO (Raleigh et al. 2010).
6 Because we only offered choices with nonnegative payoffs for each participant, our experiment does not con-
found altruism and competitive preferences—unlike the standard Liebrand (1984) design. Our design does conflate 
altruism and a preference for efficiency, though, in three of the six choices subjects are asked to make. Moreover, 
even though this game is nonstrategic (it is very similar to a dictator game), subjects may base their decisions on 
their expectations regarding the decisions made by the anonymous village members they are matched with—as 
pointed out by a referee. Unfortunately, we did not inquire into the expectations with respect to the play of others, 
so we cannot exclude that differences in beliefs about the play of others may also drive part of the result.







level Mean SD Min Max
Panel A. Preferences
Social preferences (0–100, 2009) 286 35 27.32 27.22 0 100
Risk preferences Gains (2009) 220 35 1.87 1.31 0 3
Risk preferences Losses (2009) 233 35 2.31 1.18 0 3
Discount rate (percent, 2009) 273 35 40.16 41.43 0 100
Panel B. Conflict variables
Relative number of dead in attacks 
 (percent, 1993–2003)(3)
35 1.99 4.09 0 15.63
Attack (1993–1998)(8) 35 0.69 0.47 0 1
Individual victimization index 
 (1993–2003)(2)
287 35 0 1 −0.78 5.03
Physical attack (1993–2003)(2) 287 35 0.32 0.47 0 1
Nonphysical attack (1993–2003)(2) 287 35 0.45 0.50 0 1
Panel C. Household variables
Household head is literate (1998)(1) 285 35 0.40 0.49 0 1
Household head is literate (2009)(4) 287 35 1.60 0.49 1 2
Household head age (1998)(1) 283 35 42.28 15.30 16 99
Household head age (2009)(4) 286 35 45.96 15.11 18 90
Household head is male (1998)(1) 286 35 0.62 0.49 0 1
Household head is male (2009)(4) 287 35 0.79 0.41 0 1
Household head ethnic origin (2009)(4) 287 35 0.22 0.41 0 1
Total expenditures (1998)(1) 287 35 8.56 0.70 5.17 10.7
Total land holdings per capita (ha2, 2007)(2) 281 35 5.54 5.13 0.10 34.25
Household head is livestock farmer (1993)(4) 287 35 0.41 0.49 0 1
Perceived trust level (1998)(2) 287 35 4.64 2.17 1 10
Social capital index (2007)(2) 282 35 0.02 1.04 −0.47 4.49
Investments farm buildings (FBU, 1998)(1) 241 35 5.57 1.20 1.08 8.52
Investments farm buildings (FBU, 2007)(2) 287 35 229.35 1,022.67 0 12,155.87
Share of cash crops in total production 
 (1998)(1)
276 35 0.22 0.30 0 1
Share of cash crops in total production 
 (2007)(2)
280 35 0.06 0.14 0 1
Severe draught (percent yes, 2007–2009)(4) 277 35 0.33 0.47 0 1
Access rain (percent yes 2007–2009)(4) 231 35 0.62 0.49 0 1
Manioc disease (percent yes 2007–2009)(9) 287 35 0.40 0.49 0 1
Upcoming ceremony (percent yes, 2009)(4) 231 35 0.39 0.49 0 1
Panel d. Community variables
Land Gini coefficient (2007)(2) 35 0.29 0.20 0 0.54
Distance to market (2007)(3) 35 2.86 0.72 1.38 4.22
Conflict over land (percent yes, 2007)(2) 35 0.25 0.15 0 0.6
Ethnic homogeneity (1993)(5) 31 82.87 16.89 30 99
Ethnic homogeneity (2009)(5) 35 86.68 15.57 30 100
Votes for Ndadaye in 1993 (percent)(7) 34 64.51 17.68 9.94 93.51
Socioeconomic homogeneity (1998)(2) 35 1.66 1.06 1 5
Socioeconomic homogeneity (2007)(2) 35 1.57 0.95 1 5
Population density (log, 1990)(5) 35 5.43 0.51 4.20 6.11
Population density (log, 2008)(6) 35 5.76 0.47 4.50 6.49
Per capita total expenditure (log, 2007)(2) 35 9.25 0.47 8.09 10.40
Distance to Bujumbura (km, log) 35 4.49 0.39 3.68 5.12
Altitude (m, log)(5) 35 7.41 0.10 7.14 7.70
sources: (1) Burundi Priority Household Survey 1998, (2) Burundi Priority Household Survey 2007, (3) Burundi 
Community Survey 2007, (4) Burundi Experiments Exit Survey 2009, (5) Monographies Communales Burundi. 
Ministre de la Planification du Développement et de la Reconstruction Nationale, Bujumbura, 2006 (6) Recensement 
National de la Population et de l’Habitat 2008, (7) Sinunguruza T. 2001. Les Elections au Burundi. Tout Savoir 
et Tirer des Leçons de Juin, (8) Raleigh et al. 2010, (9) FAO Valuation Des Recoltes, Des Approvisionnements 
Alimentaires et de la Situation Nutritionelle, 2006.
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for himself) to totally altruistic (if he always chose the option with the highest 
payment for his partner). We rescaled the results such that social orientation is 
measured on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 denoting purely selfish preferences, 
100 identifying the subject to be maximizing his partner’s payoff, and 50 identify-
ing the social optimum (i.e., choosing allocations to maximize joint payoffs). On 
average we find a value of 27, indicating that most subjects are fairly individual-
istic (Table 1, Panel A).7
Risk preferences were measured using a game based on Harbaugh, Krause, and 
Vesterlund (2002) where subjects could choose between playing a simple gamble 
and receiving a specific amount of money with certainty. Six choice cards were 
presented, each of which offered them the choice between A, receiving (or losing) 
an amount of money with certainty, and B, participating in a game where they could 
either gain (lose) 2,000 FBU8 with probability 0.3, or gain (lose) nothing with prob-
ability 0.7.9 Hence, the expected absolute value of the gamble was always the same, 
and the amount of money received with certainty varied across choices (lower, equal 
to, and higher than the expected value of the gamble). The point at which a subject 
switches from the risky to the safe alternative allows us to determine the respon-
dent’s degree of risk aversion.
To measure time preferences, we presented subjects with a set of nine simple 
pairwise choices between two options: receiving an amount of money at some 
date in the near future, and receiving a larger sum at a later time. The two options 
to choose between were A, receive 1,000 FBU the following day, and B, receive 
1,000 (1 + d) FBU in two weeks plus one day, with d equal to 0.00, 0.01, 0.02, 
0.05, 0.10, 0.40, 0.70, and 1.00. Subsequently, at the highest interest rate subjects 
earned an additional 1,000 FBU by waiting two weeks. In the experiment, subjects 
were asked to identify the smallest d for which they preferred B to A—the earlier 
people switch from A to B, the more patient they are. The fact that there has been 
no war-related violence in our study area for several years combined with the 
relatively short delay (two weeks only) implies we believe that our estimate of 
time preferences is not confounded by risk due to anticipated violence—people 
are unlikely to choose the near immediate pay-off because they fear being killed 
by violence in the next two weeks.
After the series of experiments, the average participant walked away with a sum 
that is the equivalent of five days of wages for unskilled labor in Burundi—a salient 
incentive.
IV. Identification Strategy, Exogeneity, and Selection Bias
The key assumption underlying our empirical approach is that violence across 
and within communities was exogenous with respect to individual preferences. 
Any covariation of preferences and exposure to violence may, however, be due to 
7 This experiment measures the weight placed on another subject’s welfare, but it may be an imperfect predictor 
of cooperation in the field. For example, patience may matter too—prosocial behavior in a fishery requires forego-
ing higher returns today to increase the community’s future returns (e.g., Fehr and Leibbrandt 2008).
8 USD 1 = 1,210 FBU (May 20, 2009), which is roughly equal to a full day’s wage rate for unskilled labor.
9 Our design differs slightly from Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund (2002) as we specifically use information 
from questions where the certainty equivalent is different from the expected value of the gamble.
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(i) nonrandom (or targeted) violence or (ii) nonrandom attrition in the sample. We 
present evidence to suggest that violence was not very targeted, and that attrition 
bias is not likely to affect our results.
Regarding the first, there is ample evidence highlighting the brutal and indiscrimi-
nate nature of the Burundi conflict (Human Rights Watch 1998; Uvin 1999; Krueger 
and Krueger 2007). To statistically examine whether “selection into violence” biases 
our results, we follow an approach taken by Bellows and Miguel (2009), and first 
assess whether violence experienced by communities is associated with lagged com-
munity characteristics; see Table 2. Violence is measured as whether or not the vil-
lage was attacked during 1993–2003 (column 1), and as the number of people dying 
in attacks in that period, expressed as a share of the total population (column 2). Our 
specification tests implicitly for two theories of violence: greed and grievance (see 
Collier et al. 2003). The first is “economic profit”—exploiting the opportunity to 
use violence for stealing the assets of others, including livestock. The second is that 
violence was driven by grievance, or perhaps ethnic considerations, as measured by 
ethnic homogeneity, votes for the assassinated Hutu president Ndadaye, and socio-
economic homogeneity. In these two columns we find no support for the hypoth-
esis that victims have been selected because of either motivation. The only two 











































Percentage literate household −0.0282 −0.0561 −0.002
 heads (in 1998) [0.0208] [0.041] [0.001]
Average age household head −0.0273 0.0625 −0.001
 (in 1998) [0.0520] [0.133] [0.005]
Percent male (in 1998) −0.00170 −0.0587 0.003
[0.0248] [0.0634] [0.002]
Percentage livestock farmers 0.0252 0.0524
 (in 1993) [0.0218] [0.0510]
Density in 1990 (log) −2.119 0.0317 0.081
[1.443] [1.970] [0.123]
Ethnic homogeneity (in 1993) 0.0155 0.0200
[0.0235] [0.0557]
Socioeconomic homogene- −0.295 −0.934 0.051
 ity (in1998) [0.392] [0.872] [0.033]
Percentage of votes for Ndadaye 0.0227 0.0457
 (in 1993) [0.0283] [0.0575]
Distance to Bujumbura (km, log) −2.561 −4.884 0.109
[1.536]* [3.039]+ [0.189]
Altitude (m, log) −8.112 −16.09 −0.748
[5.420]+ [8.252]* [0.303]**
Relative number of dead in 0.0255
 attacks 1993–2003 [0.0345]
Number of attacks 1993–1998 −0.001
[0.002]
(Continued)
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variables—distance to Bujumbura, the nation’s capital, and remoteness (proxied by 
altitude)—consistent with the pattern of violence in Burundi as sketched by Uvin 
(1999, see Section II). The F-tests on the joint significance of all nongeographical 
variables in columns 1 and 2 yield p-values greater than 0.30.
These analyses are based on a relatively small number of observations—because 
of missing variables, only 30 villages are used in the regressions. Hence we poten-
tially face the risk of incorrectly failing to reject the null of nontargeted violence. We 
tested the probability of a type II error in column 2 of Table 2. When focusing on the 











































Respondent is literate (in 1998) −0.114 0.224 0.312 0.023
[0.251] [0.234] [0.208] [0.137]
Respondent age (in 1998) −0.005 0.006 −0.002 0.012
[0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.003]***
Respondent is male (in 1998) 0.447 −0.248 −0.794 −0.054
[0.303] [0.278] [0.225]*** [0.083]
Livestock farmer in 1993 0.228 0.0958 0.0660 −0.0003
[0.230] [0.214] [0.226] [0.084]
Respondent ethnicity −0.498 −0.473
[0.310] [0.296]
Total expenditures (in 1998) 0.361 0.345 −0.193
[0.222] [0.217] [0.170]
Perceived trust level (in 1998) −0.001 0.028
[0.051] [0.046]
Share of cash crops in total 0.176 −0.499 −0.097
 production (in 1998) [0.484] [0.434] [0.367]
Expenditures farm improve- 0.0949 0.237 0.030
 ment (in1998) [0.171] [0.161] [0.098]
Constant 83.37 142.5 4.784 −10.06 −4.199 2.295 −0.993
[52.05] [74.01]* [2.473]* [0.00] [1.951]* [1.448] [0.215]***















N 30 30 94 198 219 279 1,766
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.19 0.27 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.11
Notes: Included fixed effects are at lowest level possible. Columns 1 and 2 use 30 observations instead of 35 due 
to missing 1993 ethnicity data. Column 3 uses 94 observations and not 100 due to missing 1993 population data. 
Dependent variable dead in attacks relative to number of households and not population due to missing popula-
tion data. Columns 1–6 use mainly BPHS and BSC 2009 data. Ethnic livestock ownership data are from BEES 
(2009). Dependent variable in column 6 is a dummy, 1 if respondent was interviewed in both 1998 and 2007, zero 
else. Literacy is measured as years of education. Column 7 uses the ESD-SR 2002 data to assess attrition between 
1993 and 1998. Dependent variable is a dummy, 1 if respondent was present in village in 1993 and 1998, zero else. 
Literacy, age, and gender are measured in 2002; the dummy for livestock farmer in 1993 is based on recall in 2002, 
the number of attacks between 1993 and 1998 were drawn from the ACLED database and matched to the UNFPA 
data at the commune level. The proportion of people absent from the sample was 16 percent. Regression uses prov-
ince fixed effects. Including village fixed effects reduces the number of observations but does not change the results. 
Standard errors in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
  + Significant at the 15 percent level.
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equal to 0.38 (or the power is 0.62).10 Fortunately, we can raise the power of these 
regressions by applying a similar analysis to the larger dataset of 100 villages. The 
results are reported in column 3, and the probability of a type II error is now less 
than 0.14 (power is 0.86), which is below the 0.20 (above 0.80) threshold routinely 
assumed in empirical analysis. As the 35 villages in which we ran our experiments 
were randomly drawn from the set of 100 villages we used in our 2007 survey and 
the regression results in columns 2 and 3 are qualitatively identical, we conclude 
that the probability of incorrectly maintaining the null of nontargeted violence is 
acceptably small. Hence, our data provide support for the anecdotal evidence that 
violence in the Burundi war was not very targeted. Still, in what follows we will 
use altitude and distance to Bujumbura as instruments for violence to attenuate any 
remaining endogeneity concerns and measurement error.
In columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 we repeat the analysis of columns 1 and 2, but now 
at the household level. We have two proxies for household exposure to violence: 
(i) whether a physical attack happened to a household member, and (ii) whether 
household members were exposed to nonphysical violence (including theft, forced 
labor, etc.). Neither variable is correlated with a range of household characteristics 
(income, gender, literacy, etc.), which is in line with anecdotal accounts of violence 
in Burundi (Human Rights Watch 1998; Krueger and Krueger 2007). The same 
applies to 1998 survey-based data related to the preferences we are interested in: 
(i) perceived trust levels (a measure of social capital as a proxy for social prefer-
ences); (ii) crop choice (proxy for risk preferences); and (iii) expenditures on farm 
improvements (proxy for time preferences; see Section VB).11 The regression mod-
els in columns 4 and 5 are powered adequately as the probability of a Type II error 
is less than 0.01 in both instances. While we do not find evidence that (non)trusting 
individuals have a higher probability of falling victim to violence,12 we obviously 
cannot rule out that certain noncooperative individuals were targeted during the vio-
lence (note we lack prewar evidence of the villagers’ experimental play).
In columns 6 and 7 we analyze potential nonrandom attrition between 1993 and 
2009.13 In column 6 we analyze whether a nonrandom subset of the 1998 popula-
tion was absent when we invited them for the experiments in 2009. This is important 
as households that migrate in anticipation of violence may have different prefer-
ences than those households that stayed behind. We follow the approach taken by 
Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998) and estimate a probit model of 1998–
2009 attrition on a range of 1998 household characteristics. All but one variable 
enter nonsignificantly: households headed by a male were less likely to be present 
in the 2009 sample (we return to this below). But if our 1998 data were drawn from 
a nonrandom subset of the 1993 population, this might have consequences for the 
10 We used G*Power3 software to conduct the power tests; see Faul et al. (2007).
11 We lack prewar data for these variables. Instead we rely on early war data from our first survey wave, con-
ducted in 1998.
12 We find additional support for this claim when testing whether the vectors of individually insignificant vari-
ables in Table 2 are jointly insignificant. The p-values obtained (using F-tests for the OLS models and Likelihood 
Ratio tests for the probit models) are all larger than 0.10—and many are greater than 0.30. These results are consis-
tent with the results of the power tests presented, and indicate we cannot reject the null hypothesis (i.e., the vector 
of individually insignificant variables is also jointly insignificant).
13 Attrition between our first survey in 1998 and the second wave in 2007 is below 14 percent, and below 1 
percent between this second wave and our experiments in 2009. The 1998–2007 attrition level is modest given the 
length of the period and the circumstances of civil warfare.
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external validity of our findings. We use another dataset to explore the magnitude of 
nonrandom attrition between 1993 and 1998. In 2002, UNFPA-Burundi undertook a 
nationwide Demographic and Health Survey (ESD-SR). In the survey respondents 
were asked, among other questions, to list their entire migration history, starting in 
January 1993 (before the start of the civil war). This data hence allows us to explore 
sources of attrition (which was below 16 percent) over the 1993–1998 period. In 
column 7 of Table 2 we present the results of an attrition model in which we include 
a range of household controls and fixed effects. We find that only age appeared to 
matter for migration decisions for this sample; older people were more likely to 
have stayed behind than younger heads of households—and significantly so at the 
1 percent level. We return to these issues when testing the robustness of our results 
in Section VB.
V. Conflict, Behavior, and Preferences
The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 1 suggest considerable heterogeneity 
in experimental behavior. In this section we investigate whether experimental behav-
ior varies with exposure to conflict, and regress decisions made in the social-, risk-, 
and time-preference experiments on our measures of violence. We include several 
household and community characteristics as controls, and also include regional fixed 
effects.14 We focus primarily on the relationship between community exposure to vio-
lence and individual preferences. The reason is that even if only a subset of individuals 
directly experienced acts of violence, the consequences may be felt throughout the 
community (Yehuda 2002). Our main measure of violence is the total number of dead 
during 1993–2003 relative to population size in the community. In some models, how-
ever, we also include an index of individual exposure to violence. Throughout, we clus-
ter standard errors at the community level to account for intracommunity correlation.
A. Conflict and Behavior
We explore the relationship between conflict and behavior in the experimental 
games in Tables 3, 4, and 5.15 In Table 3 we report the results for our measure for 
prosocial behavior. Across all OLS specifications we record a statistically signifi-
cant and positive correlation between altruistic behavior and conflict intensity at the 
community level (column 1) as well as at the household level (columns 2–5). This 
is in line with survey work by Bellows and Miguel (2009), who report an increase in 
social cohesion and political participation in response to violence.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects, as well as a series 
of other household and community controls and regional fixed effects (Table 3, col-
umns 3 and 4, respectively).16 For example, behavior in the experiment is more 
14 See the online Appendix for the exact variable definitions.
15 All regressions in Tables 3–5 use OLS or 2SLS. As our dependent variables take only a limited number of val-
ues, we also estimate the models in columns 1–6 using an ordered probit specification. The results are qualitatively 
identical and available on request.
16 Note that the coefficient on violence increases if controls are included. Following the reasoning of Bellows 
and Miguel (2009) this suggests that it is unlikely that omitted variable bias explains away the conflict effect (see 
also Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005).
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Table 3—Conflict and Social Preferences
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percentage dead in 1.073 0.875 1.688 1.686 2.892 0.486
 attacks [0.489]** [0.460]* [0.464]*** [0.523]*** [0.958]***
Individual 2.940
 victimization index [1.745]*
Respondent is 9.550 9.430 6.645 10.39 0.190
 literate [3.521]*** [3.450]*** [3.945]* [3.418]***
Respondent age −0.207 −0.201 −0.330 −0.202 −0.111
[0.108]* [0.109]* [0.158]** [0.110]*
Respondent is male 4.204 4.662 10.97 5.615 0.099
[3.373] [3.436] [4.234]** [3.174]*
Total land holdings 0.807 0.730 0.590 0.827 0.152
 per capita [0.253]*** [0.250]*** [0.380] [0.263]***
Land Gini −16.47 −13.60 −20.66 −0.150
 coefficient [10.01] [9.376] [12.12]*
Distance to market −6.012 −6.020 −7.633 −0.198
[2.583]** [2.542]** [2.851]***
Conflict over land −29.99 −26.79 −36.77 −0.207
[11.65]** [10.74]** [13.32]***
Ethnic homogeneity 0.204 0.232 0.148 0.080
[0.118]* [0.124]* [0.126]
Socioeconomic −2.387 −2.245 −2.244 −0.072
 homogeneity [1.948] [2.154] [2.077]
Population density 6.712 5.770 8.511 0.136*
[4.173] [5.395] [6.074]
Per capita total 1.995 2.610 0.947 0.016
 expenditure [3.046] [3.845] [4.483]
Constant 23.688 25.20 −23.68 −24.86 4.33 −12.17
[2.569]*** [2.296]*** [42.45] [42.63] [34.16] [44.99]














No No No No Yes No No
N 35 286 278 278 225 278 278
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.018 0.144 0.140 0.212 0.166 0.166
first stage instruments
Distance to −6.687
 Bujumbura (log) [2.489]***
Altitude (log) −21.988
[9.211]***
Hansen J, p-value 0.51
Partial F 7.30
Notes: Dependent variable: degree of altruism scale 0–100. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at com-
munity level. Sampling weights are not included, but results are qualitatively identical. Column 1: dependent vari-
able is community average. Column 5: household 1998 controls included. Column 6: excluded instruments of first 
stage reported only. The beta coefficients of column 6 are reported in column 7. Estimations in column 7 do not 
include clustered standard errors.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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prosocial when respondents are literate and own more land. We find weak evidence 
that social behavior is declining in age. Turning to the community-level controls, 
social behavior is positively associated with ethnic homogeneity, and negatively 
associated with distance to the market and ongoing conflicts within the community 
over land. The effect of market integration is consistent with Henrich et al. (2001), 
and the land conflict and ethnicity outcomes make intuitive sense. We find that pop-
ulation density, average community income, and land distribution are not correlated 
with social behavior.
Next, we employ a household-level conflict variable, rather than a community-
based measure (Table 3, column 5). We again find a positive correlation with 
social behavior, indicating that both individual- and community-level violence 
are associated with altruistic behavior. Note that here, where we use village-level 
fixed effects, we essentially compare victims and nonvictims within one village. 
Compared to the results presented in columns 1–4 we now also find that male 
respondents are slightly more inclined to be generous to (nonkin) fellow commu-
nity members—all else equal.
OLS regression results for risk preferences are presented in Table 4. Throughout, 
we observe a positive correlation between community-level conflict intensity and 
risk seeking.17 This result is obtained when focusing on the community as well 
as on the individual level (column 1 versus column 2), and is robust to including 
common controls and fixed effects (columns 3–4). In column 6 the dependent vari-
able measures preferences over losses. One key insight from the seminal paper by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is that people value changes in gains and losses 
differently. Their work resonates in ours because we find that conflict induces risk 
seeking over gains (column 4) while it does not affect attitudes towards losses (col-
umn 6). Though work by economists on shocks and risk preferences has so far been 
limited, this result suggests it may be a viable area for future research. It is striking 
to observe that risk preferences are not (robustly) associated with any of the house-
hold or community-level controls.
Finally, in Table 5 (columns 1–5) we summarize the impact of conflict on inter-
temporal choices. The models suggest that exposure to conflict causes an increase 
in discount rates. While the evidence seems more mixed than for the other experi-
ments, violence appears to make people less patient. It is interesting to note that time 
preferences are not associated with any of the household-level variables (includ-
ing individual exposure to violence, when controlling for community attacks). In 
contrast, several of the community variables enter significantly. Communities with 
higher levels of ethnic homogeneity and/or more unequal land holdings display 
lower discount rates.
17 Andreoni and Sprenger (forthcoming) document that separate utility functions govern the assessment of cer-
tain and uncertain payoffs. Their results indicate that experiments like ours conflate the curvature of the utility 
function and a so-called “certainty effect” as they find that subjects exhibit a strong preference for payoffs that are 
certain. We admit that we cannot distinguish between these two possibilities, but the conclusion remains the same—
exposure to conflict makes people more prone to take risks as their evaluation of the payoffs is affected. Note that 
our measure of time preference is not affected as respondents are asked to choose between two equally (un)certain 
payoffs—delayed payment by a trusted organization (to be discussed next)—in which case expected utility theory 
applies according to Andreoni and Sprenger (forthcoming).
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Table 4—Conflict and Risk Preferences
Gains Gains Gains Gains Gains Losses Gains Gains
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percentage dead 0.078 0.0651 0.0527 0.0634 0.0196 0.0729 0.258
 in attacks [0.024]*** [0.0246]** [0.0246]** [0.0263]** [0.0204] [0.0376]*
Individual victim- 0.165
 ization index [0.114]+
Respondent −0.225 −0.227 −0.005 −0.151 −0.214 −0.083
 literate [0.179] [0.183] [0.274] [0.182] [0.170]
Respondent age 0.005 0.006 0.001 −0.008 0.006 0.065
[0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005]
Respondent is −0.217 −0.186 −0.279 0.0537 −0.176 −0.067
 male [0.188] [0.188] [0.256] [0.141] [0.165]
Total land holdings −0.025 −0.0341 −0.028 −0.010 −0.034 −0.130
 per capita [0.018] [0.018]* [0.025] [0.019] [0.017]*
Land Gini −1.129 −1.026 0.0393 −1.092 −0.170
 coefficient [0.745] [0.725] [0.731] [0.740]
Distance to 0.124 0.137 0.122 0.125 0.070
 market [0.129] [0.122] [0.141] [0.129]
Conflict over land 0.0205 0.254 0.510 0.167 0.019
[0.960] [0.918] [0.877] [1.045]
Ethnic −0.000878 −0.0000909 0.00161 −0.001 0.009
 homogeneity [0.00641] [0.00671] [0.00877] [0.006]
Socioeconomic −0.00605 0.0314 −0.0381 0.0313 0.022
 homogeneity [0.115] [0.117] [0.136] [0.111]
Population density 0.326 0.418 0.430 0.441 0.149
[0.225] [0.332] [0.292] [0.333]
Per capita total −0.249 −0.274 −0.0302 −0.290 −0.106
 expenditure [0.143]* [0.170] [0.239] [0.177]
Constant 1.680 1.716 2.237 2.022 4.902 0.00443 2.149
[0.131]*** [0.145]*** [1.986] [2.116] [1.869]** [2.607] [2.045]

















No No No No Yes No No No
N 35 220 213 213 175 228 213 213




 Bujumbura (log) [2.525]*
Altitude (log) −19.221
[8.474]**
Hansen J, p-value 0.10
Partial F 6.50
Notes: Dependent variable ranges from 0 (risk averse) to 3 (risk loving). Robust standard errors in brackets are 
clustered at community level. Sampling weights are not included, and results are qualitatively identical. Column 1: 
dependent variable is community average. Column 5: household 1998 controls included. Column 7: excluded 
instruments of first stage reported only. Column 8: beta coefficients of column 7. Estimations in column 8 do not 
include clustered standard errors.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
  + Significant at the 15 percent level.
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Table 5—Conflict and Time Preferences
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percentage dead in 0.543 0.666 1.197 1.188 2.337 0.265
 attacks [0.519] [0.467] [0.624]* [0.575]** [1.058]**
Individual victimization 2.826
 index [3.294]
Respondent literate −5.540 −5.051 −12.51 −4.136 −0.050
[5.594] [5.610] [6.463]* [5.405]
Respondent age −0.162 −0.174 −0.254 −0.180 −0.065
[0.189] [0.186] [0.267] [0.178]
Respondent is male −0.168 −1.225 −11.42 −0.382 −0.004
[4.921] [4.747] [7.483] [4.470]
Total land holdings 0.154 0.331 −0.516 0.423 0.053
 per capita [0.442] [0.439] [0.633] [0.408]
Land Gini coefficient −32.65 −39.88 −47.18 −0.230
[23.40] [22.50]* [21.50]**
Distance to market 3.013 2.873 1.318 0.023
[3.704] [4.211] [4.769]
Conflict over land −14.49 −22.92 −33.35 −0.124
[24.33] [22.57] [22.80]
Ethnic homogeneity −0.432 −0.496 −0.582 −0.207
[0.224]* [0.212]** [0.195]***
Socioeconomic 7.287 6.839 6.711 0.144
 homogeneity [4.516] [4.928] [4.881]
Population density 7.489 9.804 12.48 0.132
[6.715] [7.421] [7.999]
Per capita total 8.874 7.632 5.825 0.066
 expenditure [6.479] [5.267] [5.564]
Constant 39.38 38.49 −44.73 −45.15 74.50 −29.89
[4.377]*** [3.950]*** [72.99] [70.65] [64.10] [71.18]












1998 household controls No No No No Yes No No
N 35 273 266 266 213 266 266
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.16 0.40 0.15 0.15
first stage instruments
Distance to −6.605
 Bujumbura (log) [2.519]**
Altitude (log) −22.488
[9.388]**
Hansen J, p-value 0.97
Partial F 7.25
Notes: Dependent variable: discount rate. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at community level. Column 1: 
dependent variable is community average. Sampling weights are not included, and results are qualitatively identical. 
Column 5: household 1998 controls included. Column 6: excluded instruments of first stage reported only. Column 7 
contains beta coefficients of column 6. Estimations in column 7 do not include clustered standard errors.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
956 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW APRIL 2012
Tables 3–5 thus suggest that exposure to conflict is correlated positively 
with altruistic behavior, risk-seeking behavior, and impatience.18 But correla-
tion does not equal causation. To attenuate potential endogeneity and omit-
ted variables concerns in Tables 3–5, we rerun our regressions using 2SLS 
for each of the three types of preferences, and use distance to Bujumbura 
and altitude as instruments for our conflict measures.19 Results are reported 
in columns 6 and 7 in Tables 3 and 5, and columns 7 and 8 in Table 4. 
Predicted violence is significant at the 5 percent level (or better) in the social pref-
erences and time preferences regressions (Tables 3 and 5), and at the 10 percent 
level in the analysis of risk preferences (Table 4). The values of the coefficients 
are larger than when using OLS.20 Also, our identifying assumption is that the 
distance and altitude variables affect only the distribution of violence, and do 
not impact on preferences otherwise. This assumption is contestable. Distance to 
the capital could proxy for distance to markets, in which case preferences likely 
depend on distances to Bujumbura (see Henrich et al. 2001). However, direct 
effects of proximity to the capital are likely minimal as most farmers operate 
at subsistence level, selling goods at local markets only (via which goods make 
their way to the capital). Such local markets are nearby in all communities in our 
sample (never over a two-hour walk away), reducing concerns about a correlation 
between geography and preferences. Even export crops, such as coffee, are usu-
ally sold to local intermediates or washing stations. Econometrically, this is con-
firmed by the test statistics in the bottom panel of Tables 3–5, which indicate our 
excluded instruments are correlated with the conflict variable (see the high partial 
F values) and correctly excluded from our second stage regression (the p-value of 
the Hansen J statistic is well above 0.10).
Finally, to assess the magnitude of these effects, we report the coefficients of 
all significant variables in each of the Tables 3–5 after having standardized the 
explanatory variables such that they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one. These so-called beta coefficients are reported in column 7 in Tables 3 and 
5, and in column 8 of Table 4. Clearly the impact of conflict dominates all other 
impacts. For example, the beta coefficient of violence in the social preference 
regression is 0.49, more than twice as large as the beta coefficients of the other 
variables in the same column.
18 The interrelation between these behaviors is not the focus of this paper. However, when using our full sample 
of 288 observations, we find altruism and patience are negatively correlated (r = −0.12, p < 0.04). Evidence pro-
vided by the scarce literature on the correlation between prosociality and patience using observed behavior suggest 
that the correlation is weak. For example, Fehr and Leibbrandt (2008) find no correlation between patience and 
social preferences in their study of Brazilian fishermen. This is in line with our findings: we also find no correlation 
when restricting the sample to nonconflict villages (r = −0.06, p < 0.56).
19 We have also tried using village-level violence as an instrument for household-level victimization. These 
results are qualitatively identical and available on request. Psychological literature suggests, however, that the effect 
of violence on behavior does not depend on direct experience with violence (Yehuda 2002). If true, the exclusion 
restriction of this approach would be invalid.
20 The finding that the 2SLS point estimate is somewhat larger than the OLS estimate is common in cross-
country studies, usually attributed to measurement error (biasing the OLS estimates towards zero). Alternatively, IV 
results may produce overestimates of the true effect if included instruments are positively correlated with omitted 
variables that have the same sign as the endogenous conflict variables.
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B. Robustness
We now report the outcomes of a series of robustness analyses. First, we explore 
whether differences in experimental play translate into systematic differences in 
behavior in “real life.” We estimate several models and summarize our findings in 
Tables 6 and 7. In Table 6 we replace our experimental variables with survey-based 


























OLS Tobit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentage dead 0.033 0.008 −23.75 3.080 0.0930 0.424
 in attacks [0.016]** [0.005]* [12.810]* [1.294]** [0.0574]* [1.246]
Respondent is 0.374 0.041 113.8 12.30 −0.0957 −9.317
 literate [0.150]** [0.039] [92.48] [4.625]*** [0.190] [5.915]
Respondent age −0.001 0.002 −1.019 −0.346 0.00154 −0.249
[0.004] [0.001] [3.598] [0.160]** [0.00657] [0.212]
Respondent is male −0.111 0.079 −35.47 −1.625 −0.267 7.504
[0.153] [0.039]** [78.75] [5.255] [0.215] [6.984]
Total land holdings 0.027 0.011 −7.243 0.935 −0.0304 0.158
 per capita [0.015]* [0.004]*** [9.346] [0.309]*** [0.0197] [0.428]
Land Gini 0.097 −0.465 261.6 −16.85 −0.871 −57.04
 coefficient [0.353] [0.165]*** [291.7] [16.67] [0.996] [21.62]***
Distance to market −0.092 −0.003 79.32 −8.053 0.0952 6.209
[0.107] [0.043] [54.88] [3.520]** [0.167] [4.456]
Conflict over land −0.897 −0.530 656.0 −33.90 0.149 −40.05
[0.445]* [0.180]*** [464.9] [19.73]* [1.318] [23.88]*
Ethnic homogeneity 0.003 0.002 −4.985 0.165 0.000822 −0.599
[0.007] [0.002] [3.597] [0.148] [0.00725] [0.210]***
Socioeconomic 0.044 0.011 39.08 −1.354 0.130 7.491
 homogeneity [0.124] [0.038] [53.49] [2.698] [0.158] [5.159]
Population density 0.014 0.304 −62.60 8.192 0.536 15.22
[0.186] [0.103]*** [159.5] [6.769] [0.374] [8.582]*
Per capita total −0.271 0.099 113.5 1.172 −0.331 5.042
expenditure [0.139]* [0.068] [78.08] [6.197] [0.254] [5.455]
Constant 2.180 −3.094 −635.3 −3.600 1.793 −45.52
[1.863] [0.670]*** [1261.1] [58.28] [2.643] [74.99]
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 274 277 279 212 158 205
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.23
Hansen J, p-value 0.60 0.14 0.75
Partial F 6.09 5.07 5.99
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at community level. Sampling weights are not included, and 
results are qualitatively identical. Column 2 contains an unconditional Tobit regression with fixed effects, poten-
tially inducing some bias in our estimate; regression using random effects is qualitatively similar. Columns 4–6: first 
stage instruments distance to Bujumbura (log) and altitude (log), results not shown.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
958 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW APRIL 2012
social-, risk-, and time-preference proxies. In column (1) the dependent variable is a 
social capital index in the spirit of Narayan and Pritchett (1999). This index comprises 
a weighted scale of respondents’ participation in community organizations and the 
degree of membership in 2007. Consistent with our experimental variables, we find 
a positive correlation with exposure to violence. In addition, we find that many of 
the significant explanatory variables in this regression also showed up significantly 
in the regressions in Table 3. Literacy and per capita land holdings contribute posi-
tively to our measure of social capital, while conflict over land reduces it. Next, if 
conflict alters risk preferences we would expect an effect on investments and asset 
portfolio choice––skewing resources to more risky and profitable activities such as 
the production of cash crops (see Dercon 1996). In column 2 we find that households 
in regions exposed to greater levels of violence cultivate relatively more cash crops. 
(Recall that earlier we demonstrated that growing cash crops in 1998 did not invite 
subsequent conflict; see Table 2 columns 4–6.) Again this result is consistent with the 
experimental evidence. Some of the other control variables show up significantly too 
(in contrast to Table 4). Portfolio choice of crops is more risky as population density 
increases, conflict over land decreases, and the distribution of land holdings is more 
equal. In addition, male respondents and those with larger land holdings tend to invest 
more in risky cash crops. Lastly, in column 3 we use a measure of long-term invest-
ments—the share of expenditures on farm improvements in 2007—as our dependent 
variable. The assumption is that a greater share of durable investments reflects greater 
patience. Again we find our experimental results reflected in the survey data: house-
holds affected by greater levels of conflict invest less in their farms.
Next, to further assess the robustness of our findings we return to the potential 
bias introduced by nonrandom attrition into our sample. We follow the approach 
of Bellows and Miguel (2009) and probe the robustness of our findings for a sub-
sample of respondents. This enables us to assess the possibility that our findings are 
due to changes in the composition of the population (rather than changing behavior 
of individual respondents). Specifically, Table 2, column 6 showed that men may be 
underrepresented in our postconflict sample (some 40 percent of households were 
female-headed in 2009). Hence, correlation between gender and preferences may 
bias our estimates in Tables 3–5. In columns 4–6 of Table 6 we reestimate our 2SLS 
models on a restricted sample of same gender respondents present in both 1998 and 
2009—households where the gender of the household head did not change. We find 
that for social and risk preferences the results go through as before, with only mini-
mal differences in the coefficients.
As a final robustness test we assess whether other types of shocks, such as natural 
disasters (drought and excess rainfall), plant diseases, and expenses on wedding 
ceremonies, etc., affect behavior in a similar fashion as conflict. We inserted, one 
by one, these nonconflict shocks as explanatory variables in the regression models 
in column 3 of Tables 3–5—while omitting the conflict measure. In Table 7 we 
present the coefficients on these nonconflict shocks. Interestingly, we now find few 
significant effects of such shocks on behavior in the experiments. Natural disasters 
and diseases do not produce the same traumatic responses as exposure to conflict—
attenuating the risk that our results in Tables 3–5 are due to omitted variable effects. 
The one exception is a correlation between severe draughts and social preferences, 
suggesting that responses to economic shocks differ from conflict shocks.
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C. Behavior and Preferences
The evidence documented in the various tables is consistent with the idea that 
preferences of people are endogenous and respond to experiences or (changes 
in) the context. The nature of our data, however, does not permit us to rule out 
alternative explanations. For example, there may be selection on unobservables: 
i.e., communities with greater ethnic or political cleavages may be easier targets 
because they are less able to defend themselves or, conversely, communities with 
fewer cleavages may be more likely to be targeted because of their potential sup-
port “for the other side.” The latter story would imply a correlation between expo-
sure to violence and social preferences, such as we find in our data, but of course 
not a causal effect. While we cannot rule out such hypotheses entirely, there is 
nothing in our data to support them either. For example, when we include prox-
ies for such cleavages (such as “the percentage of votes in favor of president 
Ndadaye” and “ethnic homogeneity”) we find they are not statistically significant 
and do not affect our coefficients of interest.21
Alternatively, behavioral differences may be due to learning effects—learning about 
own preferences or those of others, or about consequences of behaviors over a range 
of contexts. Or, if conflict affects the social context which in turn affects behavior in 
“real life,” then our experiment may also pick up such effects (see, e.g., Herrmann, 
21 Similarly, and following Blattman (2009), we have experimented with alternative proxies and controls to probe 
the robustness of our findings. (Results not shown but available on request.) For example, it may be that NGOs have 
selectively targeted high-conflict communities and have promoted prosocial preferences there. However, control-
ling for NGO interventions does not change our results. Similarly, selective exposure to post-conflict radio shows 
emphasizing reconciliation may potentially bias our results, but controlling for radio ownership does not affect our 
results. We also tested whether conflict induced sorting by people migrating to regions where their ethnic group was 
overrepresented. Our coefficient of interest is not affected when we control for changes in the ethnic composition 
of villages (“sorting”) between 1993 and 2009 (for our subsample of 35 communities for which we have been able 
to collect this information), and population size. This is important because sorting could be another mechanism to 
explain why conflict victims behave more prosocially towards their peers.







Dependent variable Social Risk Time
Severe draught 11.644 −0.019 2.905
[2.965]*** [0.204] [4.160]
Excess rain −1.674 −0.039 −1.183
[4.325] [0.213] [7.214]




Notes: Table summarizes coefficients of separate regressions including same controls and fixed 
effects as used in Tables 3–5. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at community level. 
Sampling weights are not included, and results are qualitatively identical.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Thöni, and Gächter 2008 for evidence on the impact of context and culture on cooper-
ation and punishment in public good experiments). Our quasi-experimental approach 
implies imperfect control, and distinguishing cleanly preference shifts from learning 
effects is not possible. The benefit of our approach is that we are able to analyze the 
response to an event of first-order salience. Analysts routinely trade off control versus 
relevance when conducting experiments (e.g., List 2007). If we are to speculate about 
the underlying mechanism, however, we believe our data do not generally support 
the “learning interpretation.” There is no reason to assume that a priori (i.e., without 
exposure to conflict) respondents’ uninformed guesses about their true preferences 
would be biased systematically towards one direction or another, and also the variance 
in behavior is not smaller among victims than among nonvictims (and hence behavior 
does not really “converge” towards the new behavioral pattern either). Details of the 
formal tests are available on request.
Similarly, our data do not provide strong support for the alternative hypothesis that 
changes in behavior are due to conflict-induced changes in the social context (or struc-
ture). Contextual differences in violence and nonviolence communities are captured 
(at least to some extent) by the community controls in Tables 3–5 (such as ethnic and 
socioeconomic homogeneity, land inequality, and income), and our measures of vio-
lence still show up significantly. It may also be the case that villagers in affected com-
munities expect more violence in the future, so that their behavior in the experiments 
reflects expectations of future exposure to violence rather than exposure to conflict in 
the past. Our data allow us to test this idea too. In our 2007 survey we included ques-
tions about subjective security in the postwar era, and we find no evidence that victims 
are more or less optimistic about their security situation than nonvictims.22
This brings us to the possibility that exposure to violence affects preferences. 
The economic literature suggests a mechanism for endogenous preferences: the 
neoclassical model based on optimizing agents pioneered by Becker and Mulligan 
(1997).23 In their theory of the short-term adaptation of preferences, individuals 
can choose (at some cost) to increase their discount factor above their so-called 
“endowed level.” For example, when expected future payoffs increase, the return to 
investments in a stock of “future-oriented capital” (i.e., raising the discount factor) 
goes up as well. Hence, Becker and Mulligan (1997) predict people make an effort to 
change their preferences and become more patient, thus increasing the level of their 
(net present value of) utility. Similar reasoning may be applied to endogenize social 
preferences and risk preferences. Individuals can (at some cost) deviate from their 
endowed levels of altruism and risk aversion. Altruism is typically modeled as other 
agents’ welfare levels being arguments in the decision maker’s utility function, with 
positive weights. Following the argument of Becker and Mulligan (1997), when an 
22 Results available on request.
23 Alternatively, preference shifts may have a neurobiological basis. Even though the genetic code of individuals 
is fixed at birth, it is possible that trauma has long-lasting effects on behavior by influencing the expression of genes 
known to affect brain chemicals implicated in social behavior—a process called methylisation (cf. van IJzendoorn 
et al. 2010). For example, trauma may influence the expression of the gene regulating transportation of serotonin 
(5-HT) (Caspi et al. 2003), which has been linked to prosocial behavior (e.g., Crockett et al. 2008), discounting 
(Schweighofer et al. 2008), and risk taking (Kuhnen and Chiao 2009). Similarly, Kosfeld et al. (2005) show that 
altruism is regulated by the hormone oxytocin (OT), and de Dreu et al. (2010) find that OT not only influences 
within-group trust, but also stimulates aggression against competing “outsiders”—and hence OT may be the driver 
of parochial altruism (cf. Choi and Bowles 2007). Whether methylisation is the underlying mechanism linking 
shocks to preference shifts is an intriguing avenue for future research.
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individual’s peers do relatively well, the rational response for that individual would 
be to increase the weight she attaches to their welfare levels, and hence become 
more altruistic—because this raises the value of her own utility, too. This theoretical 
prediction seems at odds with the reality of conflict. A conflict shock leaves fellow 
villagers worse off, so their well-being should receive less weight in the utility func-
tion of a rational individual, rather than more (as documented in the experiments).24
Our findings appear not to be unique to the case of Burundi. Related literature 
has pointed to personal growth after trauma. In the political science literature, for 
example, Blattman (2009) notes that individuals abducted by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (in Uganda) are more politically active, and speculates this is due to “changes 
in personal goals, perspectives or self-regard” (p. 243; see also Bellows and Miguel 
2009). In the psychological literature, there is ample discussion (with varying 
degrees of rigor) of how shocks can permanently alter someone’s outlook on life (or 
the value of social networks; see Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004).
Closer to our paper, Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2011) use behavioral experi-
ments to document how exposure to conflict during Nepal’s civil war contributes 
to a greater propensity to invest in trust-based transactions and to contribute to 
the public good. Similarly, Bauer et al. (2012) run a series of sharing experiments 
with a sample of children and adults in Georgia and Sierra Leone. They look 
at both inter- and intragroup sharing, and find partially supporting evidence for 
the theory that conflict breeds parochial altruism (as in Choi and Bowles 2007). 
We believe the results about intragroup altruism nicely complement our results. 
Together, they suggest, violence affects the behavior of both kids and adults, and 
the effects are both immediate and persistent.
VI. Conclusions
The literature on the consequences of civil wars has often emphasized its detri-
mental effects on households’ ability to cope. According to this view, such civil wars 
may invite poverty traps. This pessimistic view on development has come under 
new scrutiny, however, from a few recent careful micro-level studies suggesting 
that exposure to conflict is not necessarily detrimental for development and may 
contribute to social capital (see Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Gilligan, 
Pasquale, and Samii 2011; Bauer et al. 2012). Yet, social preferences are only one of 
a set of preferences of interest to development economists, and possibly affected by 
conflict shocks. We aim to extend earlier work by (i) including risk and time prefer-
ences in our analysis, and (ii) gauging such preferences with a series of incentive-
compatible field experiments (rather than via a survey approach).
In this paper we set out to investigate the impact of conflict on social, risks, and 
time preferences and use data from a series of economic experiments using 300 
respondents in 35 randomly selected communities in Burundi. We find that conflict 
is robustly correlated with behavior. Econometric analysis reveals that individuals in 
communities that were exposed to greater levels of violence display more altruistic 
24 Note that our results also extend to households who themselves have not been exposed to conflict, but saw 
the negative impact on their fellow villagers. These individuals, too, behave more prosocially, which is inconsistent 
with a theory predicting that people should care more about their peers when their peers are relatively well-off.
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behavior to their neighbors, are more risk-seeking, and have higher discount rates. 
While our data do not allow us to exactly identify the mechanism linking conflict 
shocks to behavioral change, we discuss four candidate explanations: selection 
effects; changes in beliefs; social structure; and preferences. Future research could 
be designed to distinguish between these hypotheses so as to identify the mecha-
nism linking trauma to behavioral change.
A key finding of this paper is that large temporary shocks may have long-term con-
sequences: civil war violence that occurred between 1993 and 2003 has a clear impact 
on individual behavior in 2009. These consequences may even prove to be permanent 
if they invite preference shifts. Our evidence for Burundi suggests that the net effect 
on development is unclear. While exposure to violence encourages risk-taking and 
increases the weight people attach to their fellow community members’ welfare, argu-
ably positive features for development (at least within certain bounds), it also seems 
to trigger impatience. As impatience discourages savings, exposure to violence could 
also drag down investment levels in the presence of imperfect capital markets (as obvi-
ously prevail in Burundi). If so, the net effect on the ability of communities to rebound 
after conflict is ambiguous. Nevertheless, the results may partially explain the pattern 
of recovery observed in many postconflict settings, and thereby provide new evidence 
against pessimistic views on the destructive legacies of civil war.
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